France 1940

The main tool of the German land forces was combined arms combat. German operational tactics relied on highly mobile offensive units, with balanced numbers of well-trained artillery, infantry, engineer and tank formations, all integrated into Panzer divisions. They relied on excellent communication systems which enabled them to break into a position and exploit it before the enemy could react. Panzer divisions could carry out reconnaissance missions, advance to contact, defend and attack vital positions or weak spots. 


Sdkfz.232 8-rad
                      German Sd.Kfz 254 Tracked Armoured Scout Car (Saurer, Austria)

This ground would then be held by infantry and artillery as pivot points for further attacks. Although their tanks were not designed for tank-versus-tank combat, they could take ground and draw the enemy armour on to the division's anti-tank lines. 
This conserved the tanks to achieve the next stage of the offensive. The units' logistics were self-contained, allowing for three or four days of combat. 
The Panzer divisions would be supported by motorised and infantry divisions.
                  Kuvahaun tulos haulle HOTCHKISS H 39
                                             Hotchkiss H-39

                                                Somua sau 40 tank / ARL 40

Char B1 heavy tank

                                                               French tank Somua S 35

                                                     Char B1 heavy French tank

                                                      French  Panhard 178 armour car

                           French 25 mm antitank gun, (finnish nickname Marianne)

                                                      French Berliet armour car

                                         French 25 mm antitank gun

The German Army lacked a formidable heavy combat tank like the French Char B1. In armament and armour, French tanks were the stronger designs and more numerous (although the German vehicles were faster and more mechanically reliable). But while the German Army was outnumbered in artillery and tanks, it possessed some critical advantages over its opponents. The newer German Panzers had a crew of five men: a commander, gunner-aimer, loader, driver and mechanic. Having a trained individual for each task allowed each man to dedicate himself to his own mission and it made for a highly efficient combat team. 

The French had fewer members, with the commander double-tasked with loading the main gun, distracting him from his main duties in observation and tactical deployment. It made for a far less efficient system. Even within infantry formations, the Germans enjoyed an advantage through the doctrine of Auftragstaktik (mission command tactics), by which officers were expected to use their initiative to achieve their commanders' intentions, and were given control of the necessary supporting arms.

                                                                Mathilda Mk-II  / 30 kpl in france 1940

                                                                       Cruiser Mk-1 

                                                           Cruise Mk-1

                                                  Valentine tank 2 pdr gun load

                                                    Vickers Licht tank

                                                   British AT-gun

                                                    Cruiser Mk-2
When the attack begin German armor was a total of 2690,
who running over border the French soil.
Only 349 had types Pz-III
And only 248 was Pz-IV types
The others were Czech and Pz-35 and Pz-38,
Pz-1 and Pz-II and armored cars 
also Stu 50 mm (short tube)

France had 3640 tanks, and English 310 armour in france
these would be easily prevents German tanks.

But the problem was elsewhere.
Germany used the tanks and infantry attack also artillery, and aircraft support.

Wagons fuel-filling happens jerry jugs, when France uses tanker trucks or even fuel service station, which are easy target to bombers and artillery
The Luftwaffe divided its forces into two groups. In total, 1,815 combat, 487 transport and 50 glider aircraft were deployed to support Army Group B, while a further 3,286 combat aircraft were deployed to support Army Groups A and C. The combined Allied total was 2,935 aircraft, about half the number of the German force. The Luftwaffe could provide close support with dive-bombers and medium bombers but was a broadly based force intended to support national strategy and could carry out operational, tactical and strategic bombing operations. 

While Allied air forces in 1940 were tied to the support of the army, the Luftwaffe deployed its resources in a more general, operational way. It switched from air superiority missions, to medium-range interdiction, to strategic bombing, to close air support duties depending on the need of the ground forces. It was not a Panzer spearhead arm, since in 1939 fewer than 15 percent of Luftwaffe aircraft were designed for close support as this was not its main role.

The German forces in the West in May and June deployed some 2,439 tanks and 7,378 guns. In 1939–40, 45 percent of the army was at least 40 years old, and 50 percent of all the soldiers had just a few weeks' training. The German Army was far from fully motorised, just 10 percent of their army was motorised in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles, compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British had the most enviable contingent of motorised forces. 

                  Kuvahaun tulos haulle German logistical and horse-drawn vehicles ww2

                  Kuvahaun tulos haulle german army horses ww2

                  Kuvahaun tulos haulle ww2 german horse

                  Kuvahaun tulos haulle ww2 german horse

Most of the German logistical tail consisted of horse-drawn vehicles. Only 50 percent of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, often being more poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as the German Army of 1914. In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small number of the best-equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".
Germany had mobilised 4,200,000 men of the Heer, 1,000,000 of the Luftwaffe, 180,000 of the Kriegsmarine, and 100,000 of the Waffen-SS. When consideration is made for those in Poland, Denmark and Norway, the Army had 3,000,000 men available for the offensive on 10 May 1940. These manpower reserves were formed into 157 divisions. Of these, 135 were earmarked for the offensive, including 42 reserve divisions. 
The German army was divided into Army Group A, commanded by Gerd von Rundstedt, was composed of  45 1⁄2 divisions, including seven armoured and was to execute the decisive movement through the Allied defences in the Ardennes. The manoeuvre carried out by the Germans is sometimes referred to as a "Sichelschnitt", the German translation of the phrase "sickle cut" coined by Winston Churchill after the events to describe it but never the official name of the operation. It involved three armies (the 4th, 12th and 16th) and had three Panzer corps. 

                  Kuvahaun tulos haulle heinz guderian
                               German Generalmajor Heinz Guderian

Guredian use the German armed forces in the attack-grouping same methods who are Armour-colonel Charles De Gaulle's original ideas

The XV, had been allocated to the 4th Army but the XXXXI (Reinhardt) and the XIX (Guderian) were united with the XIV Army Corps of two motorised infantry divisions on a special independent operational level in Panzergruppe Kleist (officially known as XXII Corps). Army Group B (Fedor von Bock), composed of  29 1⁄2 divisions including three armoured, was to advance through the Low Countries and lure the northern units of the Allied armies into a pocket. It consisted of the 6th and 18th Armies. Army Group C (Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb), composed of 18 divisions, was charged with preventing a flanking movement from the east and with launching small holding attacks against the Maginot Line and the upper Rhine. It consisted of the 1st and 7th Armies.

Wireless proved essential to German success in the battle. German tanks had radio receivers that allowed them to be directed by platoon command tanks which had voice communication with other units. Wireless allowed for last-minute changes in tactics and far quicker improvisation than the opponent. Some commanders regarded the ability to communicate to be the primary method of combat and radio drills were considered to be more important than accurate gunnery. 
Radio and command wagon
radio intelligence and control eye

radio intelligence and control eye

Radio allowed German commanders to co-ordinate the formations, bringing them together for a mass firepower effect in attack or defence. The French advantage in numbers and equipment, which was often deployed in "penny-packets" (dispersed as individual support weapons) was offset. Most French tanks also lacked radios and orders between infantry units were typically passed by telephone or verbally.

The German communications system permitted a degree of communication between air and ground forces. Attached to Panzer Division were the Fliegerleittruppen (tactical air control troops) in wheeled vehicles. 

                                                     Staff radio-car

                                                    Staff and Camera vagon

Staff radio-halftrac

There were too few Sd.Kfz. 251 command vehicles for all the army but the theory allowed the army in some circumstances to call Luftwaffe units to support an attack. It is said the participants in the dash to the English Channel carried out by the XIX Panzer Corps never had to wait more than 15–20 minutes for the Luftwaffe to appear over a target after they had called. 

Fliegerkorps VIII, equipped with Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers (Stukas), was to support the dash to the Channel if Army Group A broke through the Ardennes and kept a Ju 87 and a fighter group on call. On average, they could arrive to support armoured units within 45–75 minutes of orders being issued.

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