Medium Tank M1922

Prototyyppi, nimeltä Medium M1922 oli samanlainen kuin ensimmäinen M 1921 tankki.

Erot johtuivat rakentamisessa käytetystä toisen tyyppisen kotelorakenteen telastosta sen mallista joka salli joustavamman telaston käytön. Jousituksen muutos vaati siis
hieman eri mallisen kotelo rakenteen ja sille oli ominaista se, että veto-pyörät olivat korkemalla kuin edessä olevat telaketjun johtopyörät. 

Tämän johdosta kun katsoo M1922 tankin sivuprofiilia vaikuttaa siltä että tankki on eteenpäin huomattavan kalteva vaikka tankki on tasaisella alustalla. Tankkia testattiin
aberdeen alueella ja todettiin olevan paljon nopeampi kuin aikaisempi versio M1921.

Medium-A malli erosi aikaisemmista versiosta moottori Packard V-8 200 hp ansiosta.
Moottori oli kestävä ja luotettava ja se oli myös panssarivaunun valmistajan suosikki.
Panssarivaunun suurin saavuttama nopeus oli 25 km/h ja telaston jousitus parempi
kuin aikaisemmissa testatuissa malleissa. Telasto oli myös hiljaisempi kuin ennen.

Kaikista myönteisistä seikoista huolimatta näiden vaunujen valmistusta ei aloitettu.
Suurimpana syynä pidettiin ja pelättiin yhdysvalloissa tulevaa kireää raha-tilannetta.

Kuitenkaan kaikki tämä suunnittelu ja rakentaminen ei mennyt hukkaan, vaikka sen
käyttöön ottaminen tapahtui vasta 1940 jälkeen, yhdysvaltojen jouduttua sotaan mukaan, jolloin suunnitelmat ja kokeilut saivan uuden käyttö tarkoituksen jota hyödynnettiin osittain uusien vaunujen suunnittelussa ja rakentamisessa.                                                                                                                                         
                              
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The US War Department considered that two types of tanks, the light and the medium, should fulfill all missions. The light tank was to be truck transportable and not exceed 5 tons gross weight and for the medium, restrictions were even more stringent; its weight was not to exceed 15 tons, so as to bring it within the weight capacity of railroad flatcars. Although an experimental 15-ton tank, the M1924, reached the mock-up stage, this and other attempts to satisfy War Department and infantry specifications proved to be unsatisfactory. In reality it was simply impossible to build a 15-ton vehicle meeting both War Department and infantry requirements.

It is interesting to note that both Patton and Eisenhower remained involved in developing the armored arm, which found a temporary home at Camp Meade under Rockenbach's command. In particular, the two men formulated theory and doctrine for the use of tanks in mass formations to achieve breakthroughs and carry out exploitation. They met vigorous opposition to their ideas from senior army officers who favored the use of armor in support of infantry and not as a separate arm conducting independent operations. Congress took this view as well, when enacting the 1920 legislation that dissolved the Tank Corps as a separate entity.
                           
The National Defense Act of 1920 placed the Tank Corps under the Infantry. Patton had argued for an independent Tank Corps, and understood that tanks operating with Cavalry would stress mobility, while tanks tied to the Infantry would emphasize firepower. However, the supply of slow World War I tanks and the subordination of tanks to the infantry branch impeded the development of any role other than direct infantry support, so United States moved slowly in the development of armored and mechanized forces. Not incidentally, funding for tank research and development was also cut to a bare minimum. Patton, convinced there was no future in tanks, applied and received a transfer to the cavalry in September, 1920. Eisenhower got out two years later, in January 1922, when he was assigned to the staff of an infantry brigade in Panama.

The US War Department considered that two types of tanks, the light and the medium, should fulfill all missions. The light tank was to be truck transportable and not exceed 5 tons gross weight and for the medium, restrictions were even more stringent; its weight was not to exceed 15 tons, so as to bring it within the weight capacity of railroad flatcars. Although an experimental 15-ton tank, the M1924, reached the mock-up stage, this and other attempts to satisfy War Department and infantry specifications proved to be unsatisfactory. In reality it was simply impossible to build a 15-ton vehicle meeting both War Department and infantry requirements.


In 1926 the General Staff reluctantly consented to the development of a 23-ton tank, although it made clear that efforts were to continue toward the production of a satisfactory 15-ton vehicle. The infantry decided, too, that a light tank, transportable by truck, best met infantry requirements. The net effect of the infantry's preoccupation with light tanks and the limited funds available for tank development in general was to slow the development of heavier vehicles and, ultimately, to contribute to the serious shortage of mediums at the outbreak of World War II.

Douglas MacArthur at West Point as Superintendent.
In the United States the real beginning of the Armored Force was in 1928, twelve years before it was officially established, when Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis directed that a tank force be developed in the Army, after observing the maneuvers in England, by the British Experimental Armored Force. Secretary Davis' 1928 directive for the development of a tank force resulted in the assembly and encampment of an experimental mechanized force at Camp Meade, Maryland, from 1 July to 20 September 1928. 

The combined arms team consisted of elements furnished by Infantry (including tanks), Cavalry, Field Artillery, the Air Corps, Engineer Corps, Ordnance Department, Chemical Warfare Service, and Medical Corps. An effort to continue the experiment in 1929 was defeated by insufficient funds and obsolete equipment, but the 1928 exercise did bear fruit, for the War Department Mechanization Board, appointed to study results of the experiment, recommended the permanent establishment of a mechanized force.

Despite inadequate funding, the Ordnance Department managed to develop several experimental light and medium tanks and also worked with J. Walter Christie the innovative designer of tanks, engines and propulsion systems to test a Christie design model by 1929. None of these tanks was accepted, usually because each of them exceeded standards set by other Army branches. Patton later worked closely with J. Walter Christie to improve the silhouette, suspension, power, and weapons of tanks. The Christie ideas had great impact upon tank tactics and unit organization in many countries and, finally, upon the US Army as well.