Battle of Greece / Part-1

Hitler intervened on 4 November 1940, four days after British troops arrived at Crete and Lemnos. Although Greece was neutral until the Italian invasion, the British troops that were sent as defensive aid created the possibility of a frontier to the German southern flank. He ordered his Army General Staff to attack Northern Greece from bases in Romania and Bulgaria in support of his master plan to deprive the British of Mediterranean bases. 
                   
On 12 November, the German Armed Forces High Command issued Directive No. 18, in which they scheduled simultaneous operations against Gibraltar and Greece for the following January. However, in December 1940, German ambition in the Mediterranean underwent considerable revision when Spain's General Francisco Franco rejected the Gibraltar attack. Consequently, Germany's offensive in southern Europe was restricted to the Greek campaign. 

The Armed Forces High Command issued Directive No. 20 on 13 December 1940, outlining the Greek campaign under the code designation "Operation Marita". The plan was to occupy the northern coast of the Aegean Sea by March 1941 and to seize the entire Greek mainland, if necessary. 

During a hasty meeting of Hitler's staff after the unexpected 27 March Yugoslav coup d'état against the Yugoslav government, orders for the campaign in Kingdom of Yugoslavia were drafted, as well as changes to the plans for Greece. On 6 April, both Greece and Yugoslavia were to be attacked.

The Yugoslav coup came suddenly out of the blue. "When the news was brought to me on the morning of the 27th, I thought it was a joke," Hitler speaking to his Commanders-in-Chief.
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Roomassa oleva Saksan suurlähettiläs lähetti sähkeen, josta Hitler tyrmistyi.
Italia on juuri tällä hetkellä hyökännyt Kreikkaan.

Hitler sai ottaa sähkeen vastaan Montoiressa, ehtimättä vielä palata saksaan takaisin.
Hän toivoi ehtiä estämään tämän vaarallisen uhkayrityksen, johon Mussolini ryhtyy. 
Hitler kääntyi ja palasi takaisin Italiaan ja saapui lokakuu 28 päivä klo 10.00 Firenzen asemalle. 

Vastassa oli hymyilevä Mussolini joka ilmoitti Hitlerille, "me ylitimme Albanian ja Kreikan rajat tänä aamuna, Italialaiset sotilaat marssivat voitokkaasti."

Nämä Italian joukot tulivat pian tuntemaan kolme nimeä, Korca, Taranto, Sidi Barrani jotka pian merkitsi kolmea suurta Italian asevoimien kärsimää ratkaisevaa tappiota.
Samalla myös akselivaltojen tulevaisuus näkymät heikkeni ratkaisevasti.

Kesäkuu 25. 1940 jälkeen Länsi-Euroopan alistetut kansat saivat kokea ensimmäisen
valopilkahduksen tai toivon säteen.

Heti Italian hyökkäyksen alusta alkaen sekä Ciano että Mussolini saivat nähdä kuinka
kaikki poliittiset edellytykset, jotka tämän hyökkäyksen oli saanut aikaan, romahtivat.
He tiesivät myös että Bulgarian kuningas pysyy sivussa kaikesta tapahtumista kunnes ne ovat kaikki ovat ohi.
Mussolini ja Ciano oli suuresti erehtyneet ja aliarvioineet Kreikan Isanmaallisuuden.

Kreikkalaiset liitti rivinsä yhteen entistä tiiviimmäksi, saadessaan kuulla kuinka kuningas Yrjö II ja kenraali Joannis Metaxas olivat torjuneet Italian uhkavaatimuksen
ja määränneet yleisen liikekannalle panon.

Toinen seikka on se yksinkertainen totuus, että Italia oli aina Kreikan epäsuosiossa,
vaikka Venetsia aikoinaan hallinnoi Joonian meren saaria sekä Kreetan saarta, sillä
Rhodoksen ja Dodekaneesien asukkaat joutui Kreivi Cesare de Vecchi komennon alla kestämään. Nämä tapahtumat muokkaa Kreikan kansan vihastuneet mielipiteet myös paitsi Mussolinia, niin samoin Italiaa ja sen hallituksen kaikkia toimenpiteitä vastaan.
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Britain was obliged to assist Greece by the Declaration of 1939, which stated that in the event of a threat to Greek or Romanian independence, "His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Greek or Romanian Government... all the support in their power." The first British effort was the deployment of Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons commanded by Air Commodore John D'Albiac that arrived in November 1940. With Greek government consent, British forces were dispatched to Crete on 31 October to guard Souda Bay, enabling the Greek government to redeploy the 5th Cretan Division to the mainland. 

                                                                British...
On 17 November 1940, Metaxas proposed a joint offensive in the Balkans to the British government, with Greek strongholds in southern Albania as the operational base. The British were reluctant to discuss Metaxas' proposal, because the troops necessary for implementing the Greek plan would seriously endanger operations in North Africa. During a meeting of British and Greek military and political leaders in Athens on 13 January 1941, General Alexandros Papagos, Commander-in-Chief of the Hellenic Army,  asked Britain for nine fully equipped divisions and corresponding air support. 

                                                                     British...
The British responded that all they could offer was the immediate dispatch of a token force of less than divisional strength. This offer was rejected by the Greeks, who feared that the arrival of such a contingent would precipitate a German attack without giving them meaningful assistance.  British help would be requested if and when German troops crossed the Danube from Romania into Bulgaria. 

We did not then know that he (Hitler) was already deeply set upon his gigantic invasion of Russia. If we had we should have felt more confidence in the success of our policy. We should have seen that he risked falling between two stools and might easily impair his supreme undertaking for the sake of a Balkan preliminary. 
This is what actually happened, but we could not know that at the time. Some may think we builded rightly; at least we builded better than we knew at the time. It was our aim to animate and combine Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Our duty so far as possible was to aid the Greeks. 

Battle of Greece
Part of the Balkans Campaign during World War II
Nazi Germany 's attack on Greece
Date 6–30 April 1941 Location Greece Result Decisive Axis victory, occupation of mainland Greece, flight of the Greek government to Crete and establishment ofcollaborationist puppet government in Athens
Belligerents
Axis :  Germany  Italy	Allies :  Greece  United Kingdom  Australia  New Zealand
Commanders and leaders
Wilhelm List  Maximilian von Weichs  Ugo Cavallero	Alexander Papagos  Henry Maitland Wilson  Thomas Blamey  Bernard Freyberg
Strength
Germany:  680,000 men 1,200 tanks 700 aircraft  Italy:  565,000 men 463 aircraft  163 tanks Total: 1,245,000 men	Greece:  430,000 men, 20 tanks British Empire:   62,612 men 100 tanks 200–300 aircraft
Casualties and losses
Italy:  13,755 dead, 63,142 wounded, 25,067 missing  Germany:  1,099 dead, 3,752 wounded, 385 missing	Greece:  13,408 dead,  42,485 wounded,  1,290 missing British Empire:  903 dead, 1,250 wounded, 13,958 captured
Statistics about the strength and casualties of Italy and Greece refer to both the Greco-Italian War and the Battle of Greece (at least 300,000 Greek soldiers fought in Albania).   Including Cypriots and Palestinians . British, Australian and New Zealand troops were c. 58,000.  Statistics about German casualties refer to the Balkans Campaign as a whole and are based on Hitler's statements to the Reichstag on 4 May 1941.

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Little more than a month later, the British reconsidered. Winston Churchill aspired to recreate a Balkan Front comprising Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey , and instructed Anthony Eden and Sir John Dill to resume negotiations with the Greek government. 

A meeting attended by Eden and the Greek leadership, including King George II , Prime Minister Alexandros Koryzis the successor of Metaxas, who had died on 29 January 1941 - and Papagos took place in Athens on 22 February, where they decided to send a British Empire expeditionary force. German troops had been massing in Romania and on 1 March, Wehrmacht forces began to move into Bulgaria. At the same time, the Bulgarian Army mobilised and took up positions along the Greek frontier. 

                                                           Australian soldiers
On 2 March, Operation Lustre - the transportation of troops and equipment to Greece - began and 26 troopships arrived at the port of Piraeus. On 3 April, during a meeting of British, Yugoslav and Greek military representatives, the Yugoslavs promised to block the Struma valley in case of a German attack across their territory. During this meeting, Papagos stressed the importance of a joint Greco-Yugoslavian offensive against the Italians, as soon as the Germans launched their offensive. 

                                                               NZ-soldiers
By 24 April more than 62,000 Empire troops (British, Australians, New Zealanders, Palestinians and Cypriots ), had arrived in Greece, comprising the 6th Australian Division, the New Zealand 2nd Division and the British 1st Armoured Brigade.

                                                                 ANZAC troops
The three formations later became known as 'W' Force, after their commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. Air Commodore Sir John D'Albiac commanded British air forces in Greece. 
                    
To enter Northern Greece, the German army had to cross the Rhodope Mountains, which offered few river valleys or mountain passes capable of accommodating the movement of large military units. Two invasion courses were located west of Kyustendil; another was along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border, via the Struma river valley to the south. Greek border fortifications had been adapted for the terrain and a formidable defence system covered the few available roads. 
                              
                                                          Metaxas line
The Struma and Nestos rivers cut across the mountain range along the Greek-Bulgarian frontier and both of their valleys were protected by strong fortifications, as part of the larger Metaxas Line. This system of concrete pillboxes and field fortifications, constructed along the Bulgarian border in the late 1930s, was built on principles similar to those of the Maginot Line. Its strength resided mainly in the inaccessibility of the intermediate terrain leading up to the defence positions. 

Winston Churchill believed it was vital for Britain to take every measure possible to support Greece. On 8 January 1941, he stated that "there was no other course open to us but to make certain that we had spared no effort to help the Greeks who had shown themselves so worthy." 

                                                              Greek gun

Greece's mountainous terrain favored a defensive strategy and the high ranges of the Rhodope, Epirus, Pindus and Olympus mountains offered many defensive opportunities. However, air power was required to protect defending ground forces from entrapment in the many defiles. Although an invading force from Albania could be stopped by a relatively small number of troops positioned in the high Pindus mountains, the northeastern part of the country was difficult to defend against an attack from the north.

                                                           Greek soldiers

Following a March conference in Athens, the British believed that they would combine with Greek forces to occupy the Haliacmon Line - a short front facing north-eastwards along the Vermio Mountains and the lower Haliacmon river. Papagos awaited clarification from the Yugoslav government and later proposed to hold the Metaxas Line - by then a symbol of national security to the Greek populace - and not withdraw divisions from Albania. He argued that to do so would be seen as a concession to the Italians. The strategically important port of Thessaloniki lay practically undefended and transportation of British troops to the city remained dangerous. Papagos proposed to take advantage of the area's terrain and prepare fortifications, while also protecting Thessaloniki.

                                                              Italian mortar

General Dill described Papagos' attitude as "unaccommodating and defeatist" and argued that his plan ignored the fact that Greek troops and artillery were capable of only token resistance. The British believed that the Greek rivalry with Bulgaria—the Metaxas Line was designed specifically for war with Bulgaria - as well as their traditionally good terms with the Yugoslavs - left their north-western border largely undefended. 

Despite their awareness that the line was likely to collapse in the event of a German thrust from the Struma and Axios rivers, the British eventually acceded to the Greek command. On 4 March, Dill accepted the plans for the Metaxas line and on 7 March agreement was ratified by the British Cabinet. The overall command was to be retained by Papagos and the Greek and British commands agreed to fight a delaying action in the north-east.  

The British did not move their troops, because General Wilson regarded them as too weak to protect such a broad front. Instead, he took a position some 40 miles (64 kilometres) west of the Axios, across the Haliacmon Line. The two main objectives in establishing this position were to maintain contact with the Hellenic army in Albania and to deny German access to Central Greece. This had the advantage of requiring a smaller force than other options, while allowing more preparation time. 

However, it meant abandoning nearly the whole of Northern Greece, which was unacceptable to the Greeks for political and psychological reasons. Moreover, the line's left flank was susceptible to flanking from Germans operating through the Monastir Gap in Yugoslavia. However, the rapid disintegration of the Yugoslav Army and a German thrust into the rear of the Vermion position was not expected. 

The German strategy was based on using so-called "blitzkrieg" methods that had proved successful during the invasions of Western Europe. Their effectiveness was confirmed during the invasion of Yugoslavia. 
The German command again coupled ground troops and armour with air support and rapidly drove into the territory. 
Once Thessaloniki was captured, Athens and the port of Piraeus became principal targets.

Piraeus, was virtually destroyed by bombing on the night of the 6/7 April. 
The loss of Piraeus and the Isthmus of Corinth would fatally compromise withdrawal and evacuation of British and Greek forces.
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The Fifth Yugoslav Army took responsibility for the south-eastern border between Kriva Palanka and the Greek border. However, the Yugoslav troops were not fully mobilised and lacked adequate equipment and weapons. Following the entry of German forces into Bulgaria, the majority of Greek troops were evacuated from Western Thrace. By this time, Greek forces defending the Bulgarian border totaled roughly 70,000 men (sometimes labeled the "Greek Second Army" in English and German sources, although no such formation existed). The remainder of the Greek forces - 14 divisions (often erroneously referred to as the "Greek First Army" by foreign sources) - was committed in Albania.

On 28 March, the Greek Central Macedonia Army Section—comprising the 12th and 20th Infantry Divisions—were put under the command of General Wilson, who established his headquarters to the north-west of Larissa. The New Zealand division took position north of Mount Olympus, while the Australian division blocked the Haliacmon valley up to the Vermion range. The RAF continued to operate from airfields in Central and Southern Greece, however, few planes could be diverted to the theater. 

The British forces were near to fully motorised, but their equipment was more suited to desert warfare than to Greece's steep mountain roads. They were short of tanks and anti-aircraft guns and the lines of communication across the Mediterranean were vulnerable, because each convoy had to pass close to Axis-held islands in the Aegean; despite the British Royal Navy's domination of the Aegean Sea. These logistical problems were aggravated by the limited availability of shipping and Greek port capacity.

The German Twelfth Army - under the command of Field Marshal Wilhelm List - was charged with the execution of Operation Marita. His army was composed of six units:

First Panzer Group, under the command of General Ewald von Kleist.
XL Panzer Corps, under Lieutenant General Georg Stumme.
XVIII Mountain Corps, under Lieutenant General Franz Böhme.
XXX Infantry Corps, under Lieutenant General Otto Hartmann.
L Infantry Corps, under Lieutenant General Georg Lindemann.

16th Panzer Division, deployed behind the Turkish-Bulgarian border to support the Bulgarian forces in case of a Turkish attack
                     
The German plan of attack was influenced by their army's experiences during the Battle of France. Their strategy was to create a diversion through the campaign in Albania, thus stripping the Hellenic Army of manpower for the defence of their Yugoslavian and Bulgarian borders. By driving armoured wedges through the weakest links of the defence chain, penetrating Allied territory would not require substantial armour behind an infantry advance. Once Southern Yugoslavia was overrun by German armour, the Metaxas Line could be outflanked by highly mobile forces thrusting southward from Yugoslavia. Thus, possession of Monastir and the Axios valley leading to Thessaloniki became essential for such an outflanking maneuver.

The Yugoslav coup d'état led to a sudden change in the plan of attack and confronted the Twelfth Army with a number of difficult problems. According to the 28 March Directive No. 25, the Twelfth Army was to create a mobile task force to attack via Niš toward Belgrade.

With only nine days left before their final deployment, every hour became valuable and each fresh assembly of troops took time to mobilise. By the evening of 5 April, the forces intended to enter southern Yugoslavia and Greece had been assembled

At dawn on 6 April, the German armies invaded Greece, while the Luftwaffe began an intensive bombardment of Belgrade. The XL Panzer Corps - planned to attack across southern Yugoslavia - began their assault at 05:30. They pushed across the Bulgarian frontier at two separate points. By the evening of 8 April, the 73rd Infantry Division captured Prilep, severing an important rail line between Belgrade and Thessaloniki and isolating Yugoslavia from its allies. 

                                                      Italian troops
On the evening of 9 April, Stumme deployed his forces north of Monastir, in preparation for attack toward Florina. This position threatened to encircle the Greeks in Albania and W Force in the area of Florina, Edessa and Katerini. While weak security detachments covered his rear against a surprise attack from central Yugoslavia, elements of the 9th Panzer Division drove westward to link up with the Italians at the Albanian border.

The 2nd Panzer Division (XVIII Mountain Corps) entered Yugoslavia from the east on the morning of 6 April and advanced westward through the Struma Valley. It encountered little resistance, but was delayed by road clearance demolitions, mines and mud. Nevertheless, the division was able to reach the day's objective, the town of Strumica. On 7 April, a Yugoslav counter-attack against the division's northern flank was repelled, and the following day, the division forced its way across the mountains and overran the thinly manned defensive line of the Greek 19th Mechanized Division south of Doiran Lake. 

Despite many delays along the mountain roads, an armoured advance guard dispatched toward Thessaloniki succeeded in entering the city by the morning of 9 April. Thessaloniki was taken after a long battle with three Greek divisions under the command of General Bakopoulos, and was followed by the surrender of the Greek Eastern Macedonia Army Section, taking effect at 13:00 on 10 April. 

In the three days it took the Germans to reach Thessaloniki and breach the Metaxas Line, some 60,000 Greek soldiers were taken prisoner. The British and Commonwealth forces then took over the defence of Greece, with the bulk of the Greek Army fighting to maintain their old positions in Albania...

Greek - Italian war / part-2

The goal of the campaign for the Italians was to establish a Greek puppet state under Italian influence. This new Greek state would permit the Italian annexation of the Ionian Islands and the Aegean island groups of the Sporades and the Cyclades, to be administered as a part of the Italian Aegean Islands. These  islands were claimed on the basis that they had once belonged to the Venetian Republic and the Venetian client state of Naxos. 

The Epirus and Acarnania regions were to be separated from the rest of the Greek territory and the Italian-controlled Kingdom of Albania was to annex territory between the Greek north-western frontier and a line from Florina to Pindus, Arta and Preveza. The Italians intended partly to compensate Greece for its extensive territorial losses, by allowing it to annex the British Crown Colony of Cyprus after the war. 

Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Chief of Staff of the Italian military since 1925

On 13 October, Mussolini finalized the decision for war when he informed the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, to start preparing an attack for 26 October. Badoglio then issued the order for the Italian military to begin preparations for executing the existing war plan, "Contingency Greece", which envisioned the capture of Epirus as far as Arta but left the further pursuit of the campaign open. 

On the next day, Badoglio and acting Army Chief of Staff Mario Roatta met with Mussolini, who announced that his objective was the capture of the entire country and that he would contact Bulgaria for a joint operation. Roatta advised that an extension of the invasion beyond Epirus would require an additional ten divisions, which would take three months to arrive and suggested limiting the extent of the Italian demobilization. 
                                                                     Italian invasion of Greece 
       
Both generals urged Mussolini to replace the local commander, Lieutenant-General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, with someone more senior and more experienced. Mussolini seemingly agreed but also insisted on the attack going ahead at the determined date, provisionally under Prasca's command. Badoglio and Roatta seemed unconvinced that the operation would take place, like similar projects against Greece and Yugoslavia. 

Next day, Mussolini called another conference with Badoglio, Roatta, Visconti Prasca, Ciano and the Italian governor of Albania, Francesco Jacomoni. He reiterated his objectives and his determination that the attack take place on 26 October and asked for the opinion of the assembled. Jacomoni agreed that the Albanians were enthusiastic but that the Greeks would fight, likely with British help, while Ciano suggested that the Greek people were apathetic and would not support the "plutocratic" ruling class. 

Prasca offered assurances that the operation was as perfectly planned as "humanly possible", promised to finish of the Greek forces in Epirus, which he estimated at 30,000 men and capture the port of Preveza in ten to fifteen days. Prasca regarded the campaign as an opportunity to win fame and achieve the coveted rank of Marshal of Italy by conquering Athens. Prasca was relatively junior in his rank and if he demanded more troops for the Albanian front, it was likely that a more senior officer would be sent to command the operation, earning the accolades and promotions instead. 

Greco-Italian War
Part of the Balkans Campaign of World War II
Greek newspaper announcing the war
Date 28 October 1940 – 23 April 1941 (5 months, 3 weeks and 5 days) Location Southern Balkan Peninsula Result See "Aftermath" section
Belligerents
Italy  Albania	Greece  British Empire air support
Commanders and leaders
Benito Mussolini(Prime Minister of Italy)  Sebastiano Visconti Prasca (Commander in Chief to 9 November)  Ubaldo Soddu (C-in-C to mid-December)  Ugo Cavallero (C-in-C from mid-December)	Ioannis Metaxas(Prime Minister of Greece)  Alexander Papagos(commander-in-chief of the Hellenic Army)
Strength
87,000 rising to 565,000 men 463 aircraft 163 light tanks	Fewer than 260,000 men 77 aircraft
Casualties and losses
13,755 killed 50,874 wounded 3,914 missing 21,153 POW Total combat losses: 89,696 52,108 sick 12,368 frostbite cases 64 aircraft (another 24 claimed) Grand total: 154,172	13,325 killed 42,485 wounded 1,237 missing 1,531 POW Total combat losses: 58,578 c. 25,000 frostbite cases 52 aircraft Grand total: 90,000

                   
During the discussion only Badoglio voiced objections, pointing out that stopping after seizing Epirus—which he conceded would present little difficulty—would be an error and a force of at least twenty divisions was necessary to conquer the whole country, including Crete. Roatta suggested that the schedule of moving troops to Albania would have to be accelerated and called for two divisions to be sent against Thessaloniki as a diversion. Prasca pointed out the inadequacy of Albanian harbours for the rapid transfer of Italian divisions, the mountainous terrain and the poor state of the Greek transport network but remained confident that Athens could be captured after the fall of Epirus, with "five or six divisions". 

The meeting ended with an outline plan, summed up by Mussolini as "offensive in Epirus; observation and pressure on Salonika, and, in a second phase, march on Athens". The staging of incidents at the border to provide a suitable pretext (analogous to the Gleiwitz incident) was agreed for 24 October; Mussolini suggested that the expected advance on Mersa Matruh in Egypt by the 10th Army (Marshal Rodolfo Graziani) be brought forward to preventing the British from aiding Greece. 

Over the next couple of days Badoglio failed elicit objections to the attack from the other service chiefs and to achieve its cancellation on technical grounds. Mussolini, enraged by the Marshal's obstructionism, threatened to accept his resignation if offered. Badoglio backed down, managing only to secure a postponement of the attack until 28 October. 
                     
The front was roughly 150 kilometres (93 mi) wide in mountain terrain with very few roads. The Pindus mountains divided it into two theatres of operations, Epirus and western Macedonia.The Italian forces in Albania  were organised accordingly: the XXV Ciamuria Corps (Lieutenant-General Carlo Rossi (it) ), in the west was charged with the conquest of Epirus, while the XXVI Corizza Corps (Lieutenant-General Gabriele Nasci) in the east, around Korçë, would initially remain passive in the direction of western Macedonia. 

On 18 October, Mussolini sent a letter to Tsar Boris III of Bulgaria , inviting him to take part in the coming action against Greece, but he refused citing his country's unpreparedness and its encirclement by hostile neighbours. This was not regarded as a major setback, as the Italian leadership considered that the threat of Bulgarian intervention alone would compel the Greek High Command to commit most of its army in eastern Macedonia and Thrace. 
                     
It was not until 24 October that Badoglio realized that not only were the Greeks already mobilizing, but that they were prepared to divert most of their forces to Epirus, leaving only six divisions against Bulgaria. Prasca would still have numerical superiority at the start of the campaign (some 150,000 men against 120,000) but concerns grew over the vulnerability of the left flank. As a result, the 29th Division Piemonte was diverted from the attack in Epirus to bolster XXVI Corps in the Korçë area, while the 19th Infantry Division Venezia was ordered south from its position along the Yugoslav border. 

In 1936, General Alberto Pariani had been appointed Chief of Staff of the army and begun a reorganisation of divisions to fight wars of rapid decision, according to thinking that speed, mobility and new technology could revolutionise military operations. In 1937, three-regiment (triangular) divisions began a reorganisation as two-regiment (binary divisions, as part of a ten years plan to reorganise the standing army into 24 binary, 24 triangular, twelve mountain, three motorised and three armoured divisions. Prior to the invasion, Mussolini had let 300,000 troops and 600,000 reservists go home for the harvest. 

There were supposed to be 1,750 lorries used in the invasion but only 107 arrived. The possibility that Greek personalities, as well as Greek officials situated in the front area, could be corrupted or not react to an invasion, proved to be mostly internal propaganda used by Italian generals and personalities in favor of a military intervention. The same was true for an alleged revolt of the Albanian minority living in Chameria, located in the Greek territory immediately behind the boundary, which would break out after the beginning of the attack. 
                     
On the eve of 28 October 1940, Italy's ambassador in Athens, Emanuele Grazzi, handed an ultimatum from Mussolini to Metaxas. It demanded free passage for his troops to occupy unspecified strategic points inside Greek territory. Greece had been friendly towards Nazi Germany, profiting from mutual trade relations but now Germany's ally, Italy, intended to invade Greece. Metaxas rejected the ultimatum with the words "Alors, c'est la guerre" (French for "then it is war."). In this, he echoed the will of the Greek people to resist, a will that was popularly expressed in one word: "ochi" (Όχι) (Greek for "no"). Within hours, Italy began attacking Greece from Albania. 

The outbreak of hostilities was first announced by Athens Radio early in the morning of 28 October, with the two-sentence dispatch of the general staff.