Puola 1939 Poland / Osa 2

Hitler piti kaiken poliitikan aloituksen itsellä, jonka johdosta Saksan sotavoima oli
valmistautunut sotaan paremmin kuin toiset. Saksan armeija lähti liikkeelle 2.9.1939.

Puolan armeija alkoi järjestyä 1.9.1939 päivän klo 11.00 jälkeen hyvin hitaasti.
Ranskan armeija sai käskyn järjestyä sen jälkeen kun tieto Puola hyökkäyksestä oli saatu, eli 2.9.1939 jälkeen.

Tämä hitauden johdosta puola ei saanut joukkojen keskitystä ajoissa valmiiksi.
Kun kenraali Gamel johdolla tehdyt valmistelut olivat valmiit, Puolan kohtalo oli jo ratkaistu. 

Saksan kaikkissa 53 Divisioonassa oli hyvä ja moderni varustustus. Puolan armeijan käyttämät aseet ja varusteet oli vanhoja, vuodelta 1920 tai vanhempia. 
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Kun saksan hyökkäystä puolaan vertaa talvisotaan niin on yksi ero, se että lumeton vuodenaika suosi tankkeja. Puolassa oli paljon hyvässä kunnossa olevaa tietä, sekä ennen kaikkea Saksan armeija oli hyvin eri luokan armeija 1939, kuin Neuvostoliiton armeija, josta Stalinin 30-luku loppuaika puhdistukset oli tehokkaasti harventanut puna-armeijan keski- ja ylintä johtoa.
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Saksan armeija oli taktisesti ylivoimainen, panssarijoukot taistelivat omina yksikköinään, eivät yksittäin jalkaväkiyksiköissä, kuten muiden maiden armeijoilla tuolloin. Ilmavoimienkin tehtävä oli paljolti tukea maavoimien hyökkäystä. 

Eri aselajien tehokas yhteistoiminta juuri teki tuolloin Saksan armeijasta niin vahvan kuin se oli. Ranskan armeija oli kuitenkin suurempi ja paremmin varustettu kuin Puolan armeija, mutta ei sekään kauaa kyennyt Saksalle vastusta tarjoamaan. 

Ranskan armeija (28 divisioonaa) oli varustettu hieman paremmin, mutta ei paljoa.
Puola tiesi ettei Ranska pysty auttamaan ajoissa, kaikista lupauksista huolimatta.

                                                              Tks tankette
Saksa oli ylivoimainen panssarivaunuissa, niitä oli puolaa vastaan 2448 tankkia, kun puola sai saksaa vastaan vain 887 tankkia, joista 132 TP-7 tankkia, 102 Renault FT-17 tankkia 300 TK-3, ja 274 TKS tankette vaunua, sekä 50 kpl Renault R35 ja 38 kpl Vickers E, panssarivaunuja. Käytössä oli myös 10 panssarijunaa jotka Mokran kylän taistelussa tuhosi lähes sata (100) saksan tankkia. Nämä panssari junat olivat hyvin alttiita lentokoneiden hyökkäyksille.
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Lentokoneissa ero oli vielä suurempi. PZL P-7 koneita oli 30 kpl, PZL P-11 koneita oli
129 kpl. Puolan lentäjät saavutti P-11 koneilla 120 ilmavoittoa, joista oli 10 x 109 Bf ja 13 x 110 Bf konetta sekä Heinkel 111 ja Do 17 pommikoneita.

Vaikka saksa oli hyvin varustautunut sotaan, siltä puuttui eräs tärkeä ominaisuus.
luonnon raaka-aineet (natural materials).
Saksa oli malmin, metallien ja polttoaineen osalta tuonnin varassa. 

Ainoa mitä saksalla oli paljon oli rusko-hiili (Ligniitti), kaikki muu oli hankittava saksan ulkopuolelta ja kuljetettava saksan satamiin. 

Hyökkäys puolaan kulutti puolet (50%) kaikista saksan lentokone pommeista.  

Saksan paremmin aseistetut ja nopeammat koneet tekivät Puolan lentäjien aseman
mahdottomaksi, ja koneiden huolto ja korjaus olivat lähes mahdottomia suorittaa, Saksan Bf 110 koneiden pitkä toimintamatka oli etu niiden lentäessä linjojen takana.

       
Pommikoneet iskivät myös kaupunkien kimppuun aiheuttaen suurta tuhoa siviilien väelle, terrori-pommitus menetelmällä. Pommikoneita oli 1100 kpl, Stuka 87 290 kpl,
550 kuljetuskonetta ja 350 tiedustelu konetta.

Saksan tappio lukuja on 560 lentokoneen menetys puolan sotaretken aikana eli 25% hyökkäyksen lentokoneista.

Vain 26 kpl P-11 konetta tuhottiin ilmassa, suurin osa Puolan koneista tuhottiin kentille tehdyin hyökkäyksin. Puolan valtauksen jälkeen 116 konetta,  joiden joukossa oli muutamia P-11 koneita, lennettiin Romaniaan. 

Puolan armeija oli sekä lukumääräisesti että materiaalisesti alivoimainen, mutta siitä huolimatta se kykeni aiheuttamaan merkittäviä tappioita vastapuolelle ja tuhoamaan muun muassa 25 % hyökkäykseen osallistuneista Luftwaffen lentokoneista sekä kokonaisen panssaridivisioonan verran kalustoa. 

Vastoin yleistä myyttiä Puolan armeija ei vuonna 1939 ollut vanhanaikainen ratsuväkiarmeija (kaikilla Euroopan valtioilla oli käytössään ratsuilla liikkuvia eliittiyksiköitä, jotka kuitenkin jalkautuivat taisteluun), vaan sillä oli käytössään joitakin moderneja panssarivaunuja (TP-7) sekä panssarintorjuntakiväärejä ja -tykkejä. 

Joukot oli kuitenkin levitetty liian ohuesti ja  huonosti linnoitettuihin asemiin rajan tuntumaan, minkä takia suuri osa niistä joutui saarretuksi aikaisessa vaiheessa. Lisäksi saksalaisten hävittäjälentokoneet olivat teknisesti ylivoimaisia, ja huolimatta ankarasta vastarinnasta saksalaisilla oli pian ilmaherruus.

Osa Puolan ilmavoimien hävittäjälentäjistä osallistui myöhemmin taisteluun Britanniasta saavuttaen enemmän ilmavoittoja pilottia kohden kuin mikään muu yksikkö. Kaiken kaikkiaan Puola kykeni puolustautumaan Saksan armeijaa vastaan vain noin viikon vähemmän kuin Ranskan ja Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan joukot myöhemmin Ranskassa, vaikka ne olivat sekä lukumääräisesti että teknisesti paljon tasaväkisempiä Saksan armeijaan verrattuna.

Rintaman pettäessä Puolan sodanjohdon suunnitelma oli vetäytyä puolustamaan ns. Romanian käytävää etelä Puolassa ja odottaa länsi-liittoutuneiden liittymistä sotaan, mutta 17. syyskuuta alkanut Neuvostoliiton hyökkäys Puolaan teki myös tämän suunnitelman tyhjäksi. 

Jäljelle jääneistä joukoista osa siirtyi Romanian satamien kautta Lähi-itään ja sieltä edelleen Englantiin, mistä käsin ne osallistuivat Britannian ilmapuolustukseen ja myöhemmin Normandian maihinnousuun.
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Poland possessed numerically inferior armoured forces, and they were dispersed within the infantry and unable to effectively engage in any major armoured battles. 

The Germans opposing them had close to 3,000 tanks organised into independent divisions under blitzkrieg doctrine. In terms of equipment, the Poles had 132 of their own 7TP tanks, which were capable of destroying any German armour, including their heaviest Panzer IV, and had a few relatively modern imported designs, such as 50 Renault R35 tanks and 38 Vickers E tanks.

Of the 700 odd tanks remaining, 102 were obsolete First World War Renault FT-17 tanks and, not much better than armoured cars, 300 TK-3 and 274 TKS tankettes. In addition to tanks, Poland successfully used 10 regular armoured trains against German forces, which were unprepared to face this kind of combat vehicle considered in 1939 so obsolete by German planners to be given any serious consideration. 

Although the trains proved indeed vulnerable to air attack, losses incurred against Polish trains ("Śmiały" Armored Train destroyed nearly 100 German tanks during the battles around Mokra village)convinced the Germans to reintroduce this type of vehicle into their own army after the September Campaign.
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Germany had a substantial numeric advantage over Poland and had developed a significant military prior to the conflict. The Heer (army) had some 2,400 tanks organized into six panzer divisions, utilizing a new operational doctrine. It held that these divisions should act in coordination with other elements of the military, punching holes in the enemy line and isolating selected units, which would be encircled and destroyed. 

This would be followed up by less-mobile mechanized infantry and foot soldiers. The Luftwaffe (air force) provided both tactical and strategic air power, particularly dive bombers that disrupted lines of supply and communications. Together, the new methods were nicknamed "Blitzkrieg" (lightning war). Historian Basil Liddell Hart claimed "Poland was a full demonstration of the Blitzkrieg theory." Some other historians, however, disagree.

Aircraft played a major role in the campaign. Bombers also attacked cities, causing huge losses amongst the civilian population through terror bombing and strafing. The Luftwaffe forces consisted of 1,180 fighters, 290 Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers, 1,100 conventional bombers (mainly Heinkel He 111s and Dornier Do 17s), and an assortment of 550 transport and 350 reconnaissance aircraft.

In total, Germany had close to 4,000 aircraft, most of them modern. A force of 2,315 aircraft was assigned to Weiss. Due to its prior participation in the Spanish Civil War, the Luftwaffe was probably the most experienced, best-trained and best-equipped air force in the world in 1939.

Between 1936 and 1939, Poland invested heavily in the Central Industrial Region. Preparations for a defensive war with Germany were ongoing for many years, but most plans assumed fighting would not begin before 1942. To raise funds for industrial development, Poland sold much of the modern equipment it produced.

In 1936, a National Defence Fund was set up to collect funds necessary for strengthening the Polish Armed forces. The Polish Army had approximately a million soldiers, but less than half were mobilized by 1 September. Latecomers sustained significant casualties when public transport became targets of the Luftwaffe. The Polish military had fewer armored forces than the Germans, and these units, dispersed within the infantry, were unable to effectively engage the enemy.

Experiences in the Polish-Soviet War shaped Polish Army organizational and operational doctrine. Unlike the trench warfare of World War I, the Polish-Soviet War was a conflict in which the cavalry's mobility played a decisive role. Poland acknowledged the benefits of mobility but was unable to invest heavily in many of the expensive, unproven inventions since then. In spite of this, Polish cavalry brigades were used as a mobile mounted infantry and had some successes against both German infantry and cavalry.

The Polish Air Force (Lotnictwo Wojskowe) was at a severe disadvantage against the German Luftwaffe, although it was not destroyed on the ground early on as is commonly believed. The Polish Air Force lacked modern fighters, but its pilots were among the world's best trained, as proven a year later in the Battle of Britain, in which the Poles played a major part.

Overall, the Germans enjoyed numerical and qualitative aircraft superiority. Poland had only about 600 aircraft, of which only 37 P-37 Łoś bombers were modern and comparable to its German counterparts. The Polish Air Force had roughly 185 PZL P.11 and some 95 PZL P.7 fighters, 175 PZL.23 Karaś Bs, 35 Karaś As, and by September, over 100 PZL.37s were produced. However, for the September Campaign, only some 70% of those aircraft were mobilized. 

Only 36 PZL.37s were deployed. All those aircraft were of indigenous Polish design, with the bombers being more modern than fighters, according to the Ludomił Rayski air force expansion plan, which relied on a strong bomber force. The Polish fighters were a generation older than their German counterparts; the PZL P.11 fighter—produced in the early 1930s—had a top speed of only 365 km/h (227 mph), far less than German bombers. 
To compensate, the pilots relied on its maneuverability and high diving speed.

The tank force consisted of two armored brigades, four independent tank battalions and some 30 companies of TKS tankettes attached to infantry divisions and cavalry brigades. A standard tank of the Polish Army during the invasion of 1939 was the 7TP light tank. It was the first tank in the world to be equipped with a diesel engine and 360° Gundlach periscope. 

The 7TP was significantly better armed than its most common opponents, theGerman Panzer I and II, but only 140 tanks were produced between 1935 and the outbreak of the war. Poland had also a few relatively modern imported designs, such as 50 Renault R35 tanks and 38 Vickers E tanks.

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The Polish Navy was a small fleet of destroyers, submarines and smaller support vessels. Most Polish surface units followed Operation Peking, leaving Polish ports on 20 August and escaping by way of the North Sea to join with the British Royal Navy. Submarine forces participated in Operation Worek, with the goal of engaging and damaging German shipping in the Baltic Sea, but they had much less success. 

In addition, many merchant marine ships joined the British merchant fleet and took part in wartime convoys.

The September Campaign was devised by General Franz Halder, chief of the general staff, and directed by General Walther von Brauchitsch, the commander in chief of the upcoming campaign. It called for the start of hostilities before a declaration of war, and pursued a doctrine of mass encirclement and destruction of enemy forces. The infantry—far from completely mechanized but fitted with fast moving artillery and logistic support—was to be supported by Panzers and small numbers of truck-mounted infantry (the Schützen regiments, forerunners of the panzergrenadiers) to assist the rapid movement of troops and concentrate on localized parts of the enemy front, eventually isolating segments of the enemy, surrounding, and destroying them. 

The pre-war "armored idea" (which an American journalist in 1939 dubbed Blitzkrieg)—which was advocated by some generals, including Heinz Guderian—would have had the armor punching holes in the enemy's front and ranging deep into rear areas; in actuality, the campaign in Poland would be fought along more traditional lines. This stemmed from conservatism on the part of the German high command, who mainly restricted the role of armor and mechanized forces to supporting the conventional infantry divisions.

Poland's terrain was well suited for mobile operations when the weather cooperated; the country had flat plains with long frontiers totalling almost 5,600 km (3,500 mi), Poland's long border with Germany on the west and north—facing East Prussia—extended 2,000 km (1,200 mi). Those had been lengthened by another 300 km (190 mi) on the southern side in the aftermath of the Munich Agreement of 1938. The German incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia and creation of the German puppet state of Slovakia meant that Poland's southern flank was exposed.

Hitler demanded that Poland be conquered in six weeks, but German planners thought that it would require three months. They intended to fully exploit their long border with the great enveloping manoeuver of Fall Weiss. German units were to invade Poland from three directions:

A main attack over the western Polish border. This was to be carried out by Army Group South commanded by General Gerd von Rundstedt, attacking from German Silesia and from the Moravian and Slovak border: General Johannes Blaskowitz's 8th Army was to drive eastward against Łódź; General Wilhelm List's 14th Army was to push on toward Kraków and to turn the Poles' Carpathian flank; and General Walter von Reichenau's 10th Army, in the centre with Army Group South's armor, was to deliver the decisive blow with a northeastward thrust into the heart of Poland.

A second route of attack from northern Prussia. General Fedor von Bock commanded Army Group North, comprising General Georg von Küchler's 3rd Army, which was to strike southward from East Prussia, and General Günther von Kluge's 4th Army, which was to attack eastward across the base of the Polish Corridor.

A tertiary attack by part of Army Group South's allied Slovak units from Slovakia.
From within Poland, the German minority would assist by engaging in diversion and sabotage operations through Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz units prepared before the war.


All three assaults were to converge on Warsaw, while the main Polish army was to be encircled and destroyed west of the Vistula. Fall Weiss was initiated on 1 September 1939, and was the first operation of Second World War in Europe.
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